Introduction
Questions of public authority have been intimately connected to those of sovereignty and civil authority and the government of territorial states. It is also the case that the study and dispute of forms of authority and public authority that stand alongside, apart from, or beyond, the state has also been a part of these debates. Our interest in this essay lies with drawing attention to some of ways in which jurisdictional thinking might be important to thinking about public authority.
Within 'western' legal idioms, questions of multiple forms authority, plural orders and rival jurisdictional arrangements are an everyday part of legal orders. This is so as a matter of 'scope, scale and structure' (Tomlins 2012; see also Sassen 2006) . Concerns with plural and rival forms of authority arise across a whole range of juridical engagements, from the ordering of personal status and relations to the contest and re-alignment of norm generating and law-making activities of international institutions and global trade and finance. At present, jurists are engaged in efforts to articulate the forms of authority exercised by institutions such as the World Bank, NGOs or international corporations, as well as to elaborate an understanding of the relations of trade that might be realised through the pluralisation of regulatory forms and the privatisation of commercial norms (Cutler, 2003, 12-15) . For international jurists, such concerns raise questions about how to establish legal formula that detach public authority from the civil authority of the sovereign territorial state (Ryngaert 2008) .
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In place of an order of sovereign territorial states, it is argued, it is possible to establish forms and formulations of public authority shaped by 'global constitutional law', 'global administrative law', and new forms of 'administrative governance' (Teubner 2012) . For some, such accounts are best understood as developing forms of 'global legal pluralism', where overlapping forms of authority coexist and clash without a clear determination of an ultimate or superior authority (Berman 2012 , Twining 2009 ).
An understanding of the plurality of forms of authority and of legal ordering is also important and interesting to a number of other scholarly disciplines. For legal philosophers, socio-legal scholars and anthropologists, relations between public authority and the plurality of legal orders raise questions of description, status and conceptual ordering. The work of Brian Tamanaha, for example, has done much to show how attempts to do justice to the formation and interaction of legal orders requires an account not so much of legal pluralism, but of a pluralism that is capable of addressing a variety of normative orders (Tamanaha, 2007) . Without this, he has argued, it is difficult to capture either the complexity of normative engagement or the reasons why comparative lawyers, anthropologists, global studies scholars all find 'legal pluralism' a phenomena worth studying.
For world historians, such as Lauren Benton, Richard Ross, Phillip Stern and Paul Halliday, the histories of Empire from the early modern to the modern period are best understood through forms of 'legal pluralism' (Benton and Ross, 2013) . As a matter of political control and administration, they point out, the empires of European states and of the Ottoman empire engaged in both internal ordering of Empire and the study of rival and competing forms of authority. The same could be said with the military, political and juridical engagements with other empires and nations. In Legal Pluralism and Empires: 1500 -1800, the authors variously address and practice as historians what Benton and Ross call a 'jurisdictional legal pluralism ' (p.3) . From the viewpoint of world history the fact of legal pluralism (the plurality of legal ordering) is best understood in terms of 'the formation of historically occurring patterns of jurisdictional complexity and conflict'. Attend to this, they argue, and it is possible to make visible the histories of 'legal conflict in Empires to the study of circulating ideas about legal pluralism ' (p.4) .
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While the engagements in this essay touch closely both on the social and legal concerns of legal pluralism and of the relations between the writing of history and jurisprudence, our interest is slightly different to those of international jurists, legal pluralists or world historians. Rather, we examine how authority is shaped and expressed through jurisdictional technique. We argue that what might be gained in holding a jurisprudence to forms of jurisdictional practices is a sense of how such practices authorise lawful relations and provide a way of exercising authority. We do not offer a legitimation of the exercise of public authority, or a justification of the forms of public authority. Rather, we are interested in the ways in which the 'authority' of public authority takes on juridical form. We are also interested in how jurisdictional thinking provides a way of considering and locating the sorts of commitments a jurisprudent holds in articulating public authority.
In this essay we look at three engagements of public authority which have been exercised at some remove from projects of joining public authority to civil (sovereign territorial state) authority. All three point to the expression of public authority through the techniques of jurisdictional practice. Our choice of examples addresses a range of concerns that have been taken up within the office (and traditions) of the common law jurisprudent. Thus, here we focus on forms of association and accounts of lawful relationship as much as civil authority and sovereignty. The first engagement relates to the work of medieval jurists, and their characterisation of authority, which we understand or address in terms of (public) authority without sovereignty. The second is judicial -the corporate form and dominion of the East India Company. This can be understood as thinking about public authority and public consequence when that authority is held apart from sovereignty. The third is jurisprudential and addresses accounts of lawful relations found amongst the English pluralists in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The first two examples consider forms of authority that separate jurisdiction and sovereignty. The third example points to the difficulty that we now have in thinking about the 'public' of public authority without turning that concern, or joining that concern, to one of sovereignty. In a concluding comment, we briefly consider the prudence that is practiced through addressing the jurisdictional arrangements which shape the public character of transnational institutions. 4
Jurisdiction and Authority
A focal point of much of the modern understanding of public authority within jurisprudence is the concern with the forms of prestige, supremacy and subordination expressed in law and government. In this first engagement with authority we point to a number of ways in which jurisprudential formulations of public authority have been shaped by different and often rival accounts of jurisdictional arrangement and practice. Here we engage with a number of contemporary accounts of medieval jurists that link authority, jurisdiction and status or 'public personality'.
For the historian Franceso Maiolo, the medieval formulations of authority show that there is both a specific history of the terminology of sovereignty and great variety in the formulations of jurisdictional arrangements. For Maiolo, the repertoires of jurisdiction developed by the medieval jurists covered a broad range of interlinked concerns. The widest concern of jurisdictio relates to establishing the authority of a supreme power charged with the obligation of securing justice and equity. Jurisdiction relates both to the authority and power to judge or act on a matter. The term 'jurisdictional' could qualify the activity of the jurisprudent (discussing the rules of civil life), the juris doctor (elaborating and explaining the content of rules) as well as that of the judge (the authority to decide) and the legislator (exercising the authority to create new law) (Maiolo 2010, 141-142) . In short, Maiolo treats jurisdiction as providing the juridical form of the understanding and exercise of authority.
The theological and political understanding of authority was most often shaped around the relations between ordo ordinans and ordo ordinatus or, in modern idioms, constituent and constituted authority. For political philosophers and public lawyers the elaboration of versions of this relation continues to shape distinctions between auctoritas and potestas (authority and power) and, in more complex ways, between imperium and dominium (Berman 1983, 114-115 (Maiolo 2010, 207-209, 288) . The important practical and conceptual distinctions of authority were shaped between potestas and violentia (right and might) rather than between auctoritas, jurisdictio and potestas. This, for many, has been viewed as a distinctly modern formulation of sovereign authority.
However, as Maiolo has pointed out, this formulation reflects a particular concern with authority rather than with a general concept of sovereignty (Maiolo 2010, 151-152, 285) .
Like the jurist Azo, Marsilius argued that while the Emperor had the maximum power in the sense that the Emperor had the greatest power, it was the people who had the fullest power (potestas) because it was they who carried natural reason exercised in securing civil peace. In this way, writing as philosopher, rather than jurist, Marsilius reformulated the understanding of the plenitude or fullness of the jurisdiction of the Pope (ibid., 287). In our gloss here we have noted the way in which jurisdictio brings with it an account of authority and public personality, although not necessarily one shaped by distinctions of public and private authority. Jurisdictio provides the office of the jurist with a device for the technical means of ordering legitimacy and for ways of considering disparate accounts of legality.
A second jurisdictional theme, one that is also taken up by contemporary jurisprudence and historiography, is that of dual or rival spiritual and temporal sources and forms of authority.
Recently, Anne Orford has presented Bartolus' account of jurisdiction as resonating with contemporary attempts to shape the practice of the United Nations Security Council and related institutions in terms of the jurisdictional arrangement of public authority (Orford 2011, 159-160) . Orford argues that paying attention to the rival accounts of medieval then through the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, is that, for the latter, authority is caste in terms of function and purpose rather than status and office (Ibid., 148-150).
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In drawing apart the concerns of jurisdiction, public authority and state sovereignty, we note both the plurality of the forms of jurisdictional arrangement and practice and the juristic concern with a plurality of jurisdictional forms and devices of authority. To render public authority in terms of a jurisprudence we have also made a generalisation about the forms of inheritance of jurisdictional practice. Our gloss on Maiolo and Orford draws contemporary thought of public authority back to the technical forms of authority, status and jurisprudence.
Thus, our first take on the jurisdictional form of public authority is to treat public authority as a status and as something like an assemblage of jurisdictional devices and practices.
East India Company: Corporations, Authorities and Thinking with Public Consequence
Within the common law traditions, it is the mode and manner of the authorisation of lawful relations that offers the clearest account of the forms of public authority. The relationship between the sovereign, the body politic and public authority can be treated in a number of ways. In the early modern period it is the corporation and the office that are the legal forms that represent public authority and through which government is conducted. Phillip J Stern, for example, has characterised both English and colonial government in terms of the plurality of forms of corporate association (Stern 2013, 21-48) . The East India Company is one such corporate arrangement through which trade and government were conducted. Here we follow the relation between public authority, sovereignty and the jurisprudence of public law by paying attention to jurisdictional practices found within the common law tradition. In doing so, we examine some of the difficulties of holding public authority and the particular juridical status of the sovereign apart or, indeed, in close relation. The East India Company provides one possible account of public authority within a common law idiom. We ask what it might be approached through his Treatise on Arms and Signs (Bartolus, 1538 discussed Goodrich, 2014, 50, 63) . It is through emblems and signs, argues Goodrich, that the ordering of public life -its offices, duties, rights, privileges -is given form. In medieval terms, emblems provide the mark of office. In a modern, less institutional idiom, they stage or bring to life the norms or rules of action. The task of the ordering of appearances and of bringing law to life is part of the honour of the jurist (Ibid., 213-214).
mean as a matter of jurisdiction for a juridical order to separate the work of public authority from the supposition of the sovereign territorial state. Rather than considering the authority of the East India Company as simply established through delegated prerogative (East India
Company v Sandys 1 Vern. 127; 23 ER 362 (1682)), a point to which we return later, we describe its authority as established through the projects of jurists (and judges as jurists), who address a range of charters and treaties, express authority through jurisdictional arrangements, and measure the material effects which have 'public consequence'.
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The East India Company's first charter gave exclusive right to trade in a defined area. For all charters referred to in this essay see Shaw (1887).
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For the Charter of the Levant Company see Cecil T Carr (ed), (1913, 30 and of governing settlements (1683 Charter), thereby ensuring it was subject to Company control (Jain 2009, 17) . Within the Presidencies, therefore, to the extent that there was a functioning legal system, jurisdiction depended on status -subject and resident. Later, as the company moved out from the Presidencies, a complex array of local courts were established.
In the areas adjacent to the Presidency towns -known as the mofussil -the East India company courts -the adalats -operated. These operated under a supposed delegation of power from the Moghuls and administered the personal laws of the Hindus and Muslims and 'justice, equity and good conscience' (Jain 2009, 252-253) . English law was not binding on non-subjects. Beyond these land bases, the Charters of 1683/1686 authorised the company to establish Admiralty courts in order to seize the ships of 'interlopers' within their areas of exclusive trade (Bruce 1810, 496) . 9 These courts did not last that long -they were largely defunct by the late eighteenth century -however they did constitute a significant form of jurisdictional arrangement that shaped the juridical authority of much of the company's exclusive trading zone (Stern 2011, 60 population. Nor was jurisdiction bound to property (dominium). 10 While the company came to be seen as having territorial (spatial) form in the eighteenth century, at this period its jurisdictional arrangements still largely relied on the main form of jurisdictional attachment of the early modern period -status (here subjecthood and residency). 11 It is tempting to characterise the Company as having territorial authority -after all they asserted jurisdiction over non-subjects within the areas of the Presidency. However, to the extent that this was territorial, it was not territoriality in the sense of the modern territorial state.
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Regardless of whether the East India Company was, or could be, regarded as 'sovereign' in the seventeenth century, there was little attempt to argue in this period that it had territorial form (based on land). Rather, its authority (whatever the character) relied on the delegated prerogative. Or, as described above, its authority (whatever its character) can be described as In East India Company v Sandys there were arguments (largely accepted by the court) that the company's possessions were in the nature of a franchise. However, this argument went not to the character of the company's authority in the East Indies, but to the question of whether some kind of proprietary interest could be found on which the company could found an action: see arguments of Holt for the company (at 382) and the judgment of Jeffries CJ (at 553-4).
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This is generally dated to the mid eighteenth century: see Buchan (1994) .
12 Jain reminds us that there was no concept of territorial law in India at the time as such -all criminal law was Muslim, but civil inheritance, succession and others were personal depending on religion (Jain 2009, 10 14 and exercised -here with public consequence. At another level, as we will discuss in the final section of the essay, the linking of public authority through the jurisdictional arrangement of public consequence is taken up again in the modern address of international institutions.
There contemporary jurisprudence shapes such relationships by establishing public authority through a variety of 'technical means' that in turn create matters of public consequence.
Plural Forms of Authority
In our third example we turn attention to some of the difficulties of detaching the practices of jurisdiction from those of sovereignty and territory in the early twentieth century. To do this we turn to the 'English pluralists', especially Frederick Maitland (1850 Maitland ( -1906 and John
Neville Figgis (1866 Figgis ( -1918 , and more briefly, Harold Laski (1893 Laski ( -1950 , in order to follow some of the ways in which they tried to configure forms of political and legal association apart from the (British) sovereign territorial state -or at least apart from the sovereign territorial state as conceived by Hobbes and Austin (Hirst, 2005; Runciman 1997) . (Cole 1920) . Here, we track the ways in which attending to the language of jurisdiction (or its absence) make the plural forms of public authority visible (or invisible).
By associating East India Company and English pluralists we are drawing again on the link between the status of the legal actor (sovereign, corporate) and the practice of jurisdiction.
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Maitland's work is significant because it engages both in disputing of the juridical form of the state and in developing historical understanding of centrality jurisdiction and procedure within the common law tradition (McLean 2012, 71) . What is striking is the difficulty that
Maitland has in joining these engagements. Maitland wrote the history of the common law in
The connections between corporate form, trust, and the example of the East India Company are briefly discussed by Maitland in his essay 'Trust and Corporation' in Runciman and Ryan (2003) . See also the discussion by Stern (2013).
terms of its practices of procedure and jurisdiction. In doing so he emphasised the practicality and specificity of both the form and knowledge of law (Maitland 1909) . The moral and political concern with 'real' associations was given corporate but not jurisdictional form. Ibid., 33, 40; Geary (2005) ). He joined this specific concern with his more general one that associations should have an organic existence independent of the ways in which the State recognises or purports to grant their existence (Ibid., 46). In contrast to the imperial power of the state, Figgis offered an account of (English) liberty of association expressed as part of a spiritual being (Ibid., 51).
Coker, amongst others, has pointed out the ways in which Figgis' argument seems to repeat accounts of sovereignty and the primacy of the form of the State (Coker 1921 In his Studies in the Problem Of Sovereignty, Laski also addressed the Free Church Case.
Like Figgis he was concerned with political facts. In so doing, he placed emphasis on the contest of the authority of the state to 'intervene' in church affairs. Laski also drew a link between the challenge to the state as an idea and acts of resistance to secular power -a concern that is framed around nineteenth century accounts of church and state more so than
Figgis' invocation of medieval thought. Laski, like Figgis, assumed a community that is capable of advancement and coherent ordering (Laski 1916) . However his community is individualistic and self created.
In establishing their accounts of association Figgis and Laski, like Cole, turned their analysis from group personality to function in order to characterise the conditions of a pluralistic political society (Loughlin 2005) . Figgis, did not did not seek to abolish public authority or power but tasked it with the 'function' of making laws for the flourishing of associations (Figgis, 1913) . In Authority in the Modern State, Laski characterised public authority in terms of function and purpose (coordination of lawful relations and associations) (Laski 1919) . In so doing attention is turned from legal form and procedure to that of state administration and government. The sense of the importance of administration and social function is emphasised most strongly in the work of Cole and Laski. Laski's formulation of 'administrative' areas responds to the view that the state should be seen as one association amongst many.
Questions of ordering, legitimacy and loyalty should be understood accordingly (Laski, 1925) . The 'functional' for writers like Cole ran against representative models of both politics and law. It did so because the universal character of individuals prevents their will and purpose being limited (Hirst, 1997, 31) . What interested Cole then was how associations were brought into being and maintained their associations and relations (Cole 1920, Ch 3) . In Much of the effectiveness of Schmitt's argument turns on his sense that the unity of the state is a matter both of authority (auctoritas) and power (potestas). Schmitt also ties this concern to that of the representation of authority, or rather to the need of the sovereign to present authority (Kelly 2004) . While the pluralists drew attention to the institutions of the state and the conditions of the formation of associations, they did so by turning relations of law into social relations. What the pluralists are left with, argues Schmitt, is a species of private authority (Kelly, 2004, 129) . 
Concluding Comments: Technical Means of Public Authority
This essay has followed two themes. First, it has examined three gestures of jurisdiction as examples of the technical means of establishing public authority. Second, it has investigated the reception and use of these gestures in contemporary jurisprudences of authority beyond or apart from the state. The presumption of this essay has been that there is something to be gained from treating such engagements as conducted through rival jurisprudences of jurisdiction. We have concentrated on offering a number accounts of the ways in which jurisdictional arrangements carry concerns of authority and public authority. In doing so we have offered a positive argument for continuing to address questions of public authority through the practices of jurisdiction.
One of the advantages of addressing questions of public authority through the practices of jurisdiction is that it allows for questions of jurisprudence to addressed (historically) in terms of institutional conduct. In this concluding section we look to the techniques of jurisdictional arrangement, and the ways in which authority is exercised, by briefly following the jurisdictional forms of non-state public authority into the international domain.
In taking up the work of Paul Hirst in the last section, we noted how he traced the ways in which the pluralists linked their concern with political authority to technical means. Hirst shaped his understanding of globalism by addressing material, technical and institutional forms through which geo-political, juridical and economic activities are conducted (Hirst 2005 ). If we translate Hirst's concerns with the practical realisation of authority into the genres of jurisprudence and the practices of jurisdiction a number of observations can be made about the kinds of jurisdictional practice that might carry forms of public authority or public consequence.
From within the University and the disciplines associated with public law, accounts of public authority in the international domain are shaped around the concerns of executive rule, constitution, administration and adjudication (Ryngaert 2008, 5-10) . The concern with jurisdictional arrangements divides more or less between the sorts of discussion associated with the allocation of disputes for adjudication and a set of concerns about overall organisation of relations of authority in the international domain (Teubner 2012 , Berman 2012 . However, by way of a final comment, we pull back from the public law thinking of international law and note a prudential side to jurisdictional thinking which emphases the creation of relationships of public authority.
The prudence of jurisdictional thinking is illustrated here through Annelise Riles' ethnographic and jurisprudential analysis of the regulation of global financial markets (Riles 2011). In Collateral Knowledge, Riles examines forms of engagement with the management of the markets and the practices of regulation. Her work links 'knowledge practices' to the ways in which 'legal technique' has been deployed to create the financial derivatives market (Riles 2011, 9-11) . Riles' work is interesting for the way in which it frames authority through the authorisation of relations rather than through an institutional arrangement of the public institutions of the international order. The ordering of financial markets can be viewed as a matter of private regulation, but the ordering of financial markets clearly is also a matter of 'public consequence', both in the sense that it has had disastrous consequence for the public and the sense in which it has involved public institutions creating regulations and acting as regulators (however defined). Riles is concerned with a range of institutions and office holders that carry out regulatory practices in what might be considered either as the global public sphere or a global private sphere. What interests us here are the ways in which the concerns of governance and administration and those of constitutional thinking are both kept at some distance apart. For Riles, the way in which the regulation of financial services is conducted is most cogently understood in terms of technique and technocratic means. Such techniques are shared both by the public and private officials in their varied attempts to understand and act in the working of the global financial markets (Riles 2011, 240-242).
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As a matter of office and role Riles notes that similar juridical and accounting techniques are required of regulators and technocrats in a variety of situations (Riles 2011, 223-225) . In turning these observations to techniques of jurisdiction, Riles might be seen as offering a prudential account of the value of regulation and the technical means of creating forms of authority. In this account public and private authority alike are viewed as technique and as part of an ethos of office. For Riles, like Maitland but not Figges and Laski, to frame legal knowledge and authority in terms of technique is part of an attempt to make more knowable the technical forms by which the international finance and our lives are created and ordered.
Netting law allows parties to save or complete their obligations in the event of bankruptcy even when these obligations might be void in a formal legal sense. These laws were part of a suite of legislation passed in the 1990s designed to provide security of interests in the derivative markets. See, for example, Unidroit Study LXXVIII C -Principles and rules on the netting of financial instruments: http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2011/study78c/s-78c-04-e.pdf (last accessed 4 August 2014).
26
This returns us to the projects of jurists and jurisprudents to join and separate what is public and lawful about jurisdictional practices.
We close this essay by making a discrete observation about a jurisprudence that takes its cue from jurisdictional practice. Without offering our argument as a systematic thesis, we have tied our accounts of public authority to forms of jurisdictional and prudential thinking about lawful relations. We have presented our account of jurisdictional practice by joining it to the commentaries of jurists and jurisprudents. In so doing the concerns of jurisdiction have been treated as something apart from efforts to produce either a public law jurisprudence or explanations of public authority that are directed to the work of theorising, explaining or securing legitimacy. Holding back from direct engagements with those concerns has enabled us to present an essay on jurisdiction as a concern of the conduct of authority through technical means. It also opens a space for considering again some of the commitments of the relationship between public authority, jurisdiction, jurisprudence and their writing.
